CURRICULUM VITAE

Affiliation : Université Laval

Équipe : Archives Husserl

Champs de recherche : Phénoménologie, Husserl, idéalisme allemand, réception française de Husserl

Présentation de la recherche

Depuis le début des années 2000 l’on a vu s’esquisser, au sein de la philosophie continentale d’expression française, une ligne de partage plus ou moins définie entre réalisme et antiréalisme[1]. Mes recherches s’inscrivent dans cette discussion et visent à y contribuer en proposant une relecture de l’idéalisme phénoménologique transcendantal fondé par E. Husserl. L’identification explicite de la phénoménologie à la tradition idéaliste, dans les Méditations cartésiennes, est intimement liée à la tentative d’accomplir une fois pour toutes l’intention qui travaillait les travaux de Husserl dès les Recherches logiques, à savoir la constitution d’une philosophie première, véritablement scientifique, permettant de remédier à la tendance sceptique, relativiste, voire mystique des philosophies contemporaines[2]. L’objectif général de mes recherches est le suivant : montrer que la genèse de l’idéalisme husserlien est liée à la thématisation de la question du statut du discours philosophique. C’est parce que la phénoménologie aspire au statut de philosophie première et scientifique qu’elle s’identifiera à la tradition responsable d’avoir réalisé le plus pleinement cette intention. Lisant l’idéalisme husserlien à l’aune des recherches récentes faisant de la question du statut du philosopher critique le foyer de l’idéalisme allemand, qui s’incarne d’abord dans les travaux de G. Lebrun (avec Hegel), puis dans ceux d’I. Thomas-Fogiel (avec Fichte) et d’A. Grandjean (avec Kant) [3], j’espère ouvrir la phénoménologie sur un nouvel horizon interprétatif qui congédie la façon dont la première réception française de Husserl a le plus souvent conçu son « tournant idéaliste », à savoir comme la rémanence dogmatique d’une volonté de réduire l’aséité de la réalité à l’efficace constitutive du sujet.

[1] Nous privilégions l’expression « antiréalisme », bien que personne, à notre connaissance, ne s’en revendique, pour la simple raison que les adversaires du réalisme ne s’attribuent pas davantage l’étiquette d’« idéalistes ».

[2] Les Recherches logiques dénoncent la tendance relativiste et sceptique du psychologisme ; la Krisis reprend les mêmes griefs à l’égard de la philosophie contemporaine, laquelle serait au surplus en proie de s’effondrer dans un mysticisme ou un irrationalisme. (Crise des sciences européennes et la phénoménologie transcendantale, trad. G. Granel, Paris, Gallimard, 1976, § 1, p. 7).

[3] Gérard Lebrun, La patience du concept : essai sur le discours hégélien, Paris, Gallimard, 1972  ; Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel, Critique de la représentation: étude sur Fichte, Paris, J. Vrin, 2000 ; Antoine Grandjean, Critique et réflexion: essai sur le discours kantien, Paris, J. Vrin, 2009.

Mots clé : Phénoménologie, idéalisme, Husserl, Fichte, Merleau-Ponty

Choix de publications

• « La réflexivité dans l’idéalisme de Fichte et de Husserl », Philosophie, no 53, vol. 2, p. 42-60.

Reconstructing the naïve theory of the self

by Francesco Maurelli (Constructor University)

The concept of the self refers to the idea that humans possess something that underlies the continuity of the individual and the perception of both the individual him- or herself and the individual’s social environment. Scientific analyses commonly presuppose that something like “a self” exists and that its internal workings, its neural correlates, and its interactions with other psychological processes require investigation. We are investigating the characteristics which elicit attribution of aspects of selfhood. In particular we have four major research questions: (a) what are the behavioral core characteristics that an artificial agent needs to show in order to be attributed a self by a human observer?; (b) Can an autonomous artificial agent that shows all the relevant behavioral core characteristics be reliably distinguished from an agent controlled by a human in terms of selfhood?; (c) to which degree the core characteristics contribute to selfhood-related judgments? and (d) what are the social and behavioral consequences of attributing particular core characteristics to artificial agents? The talk will present preliminary results focusing on causality and speed.

The Mediated-Mediating Nature of Consciousness: An Enactive and Phenomenological Exploration of the Twisted Loop between Body and World

by Shigeru Taguchi (Hokkaido University)

In this paper, I will discuss consciousness and the self from the perspective of the enactive approach and “mediation-based phenomenology,” which I am developing under the influence of Hajime Tanabe’s philosophy. Rather than being a substantial entity, consciousness is essentially mediated. Specifically, consciousness is mediated by both the body and the world, serving as a connection and differentiation between the two. If we consider consciousness anchored and tied to the individual body, it becomes what we refer to as the “self.” However, consciousness is also mediated by the world, which opens it up to the infinite universe. In other words, it establishes a unique relationship with infinity focused on each body. Thus, consciousness bridges the poles of individuality and infinity. We use the phrase “consciousness exists” to describe the establishment of a “twisted loop” involving both poles, which Kitaro Nishida refers to as a contradictory self-identity through absolute negation. When consciousness exists, the infinite universe is mirrored within it, and simultaneously, this mirroring arises as an individual facticity of incomparable “here and now.”

We as Self: Ouri, Intersubjectivity, and Presubjectivity

by Hye Young Kim (Archives Husserl, École normale supérieure)

“We as Self” argues for a notion of we-ness based not on a self-centered or a self-less point of view, in which the “we” is only either a collection of individuals or an anonymous whole, but on “relation.” This relation is pre-subjective, meaning that the conscious, reflective, subjective self is not the conceptual basis of the relation. The irreducible metaphysical distinction between self and other is always there, but the awareness of it is not prior to this relation, which is an ontological pre-condition of self. The distinction and unity of self and other in this relation can be comprehended spatially by applying knot logic. Certain linguistic practices in Korean could show one representation of pre-subjective we-ness in language, but not in an ethnographical manner.

The self between bounded infinities

by Rein Raud (Tallinn University, Estonia)

In my previous work I have used the expression “bounded infinity” for the sum total of possible futures as seen from one particular perspective — there are infinitely many ways in which things could go, but the infinity is not boundless, as there are things that cannot happen. Symmetrically, the same concept applies to the causes that have led to the situation in the present — one of the classical problems of causality states precisely that if we take into account absolutely all chains of causes and results that have contributed to a given state of affairs, then the concept of causality loses sense, because the domain of relevant causes increases with their distance, until absolutely everything has to be included.

As I view “the self” as a field in which certain vectors of the past are turned into trajectories reaching out into possible futures, this field can be said to be determined by two bounded infinities of relevant pasts and possible futures. In my talk, it is my intent to elaborate on this view and to investigate how it might relate to other ways of thinking about infinity.

Takeuti on finite and infinite sets

by Ryota Akiyoshi (Keio Global Research Institute) and Andrew Arana (Université de Lorraine, Archives Poincaré)

Gaisi Takeuti is known best as a proof theorist, but he also wrote considerably on set theory. In his proof-theoretic writings on finitism, a novel view on the difference between finite and infinite sets emerges, in the context of qualifying epsilon_0 as a finitely accessible ordinal. In this talk I want to focus on this novel view, which I will show has a background in the Japanese philosophy of the Kyoto School of the early twentieth century, with which he was acquainted through various personal connections. Takeuti identifies a set with the kind of “mind” that generates it: finite minds, infinite minds, constructive minds, etc. A consequence of this view is that the boundary between the finite and infinite is more permeable than it is on the classical view coming from Cantor.

“WE-Turn” of Freedom to “WE-Standard” for Ethics of AI and Robots

by Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto University)

This presentation is a sequel to the keynote speech on the “WE-turn” at the Osaka University  Symposium in August 2022. Here the “WE-turn” is applied to « freedom » as well, and the concept of  “freedom as softening of WE” is proposed as an alternative to the standard Western concept of  “freedom as autonomy of I or an individual human”. This talk also argues that the « fundamental  incapability of single action » discussed in the Symposium also holds true for a partial action, that is, an  action of each individual agent in a “WE” and show that “I” and other agents who jointly constitute “WE”  are « infinitesimal agents » that have « incapability of partial single action ». Furthermore, based on these  conceptual devices, as an alternative to Verbeek’s ethical standard for robots and AIs (Verbeek Criterion),  which states that robots, AIs, and other artifacts must not violate the autonomous freedom of individual  humans (Verbeek, 2011), we argue that robots and AIs that constitute “WE” as equal partners or fellows  of human beings, must achieve, together with human beings, a better, more « softened” WE.

Reference

P-P. Verbeek, Moralizing Technology: Understanding and Designing the Morality of Things, University of Chicago Press (2011)